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TEN QUESTIONS: RESPONSES OF JOHN CARY SIMS 1

1.

Has modern warfare rendered the Geneva Conventions quaint?

The broad principles reflected in the Geneva Conventions remain as
important as ever. Especially in a world afflicted by numerous conflicts
being waged with great ferocity, sometimes reflecting religious divisions,
or characterized by an effort to label opponents as "terrorists" or "war
criminals," it is essential to respect and adhere to the core doctrine
unifying the Geneva Conventions and related aspects of the law of armed
conflict: No matter which belligerent may be in the "right" with regard to
jus ad bellum, the manner in which the hostilities are carried out must be
I
evaluated by reference tojus in bello.
Certainly the nature of many modem conflicts, be they guerilla wars
like Vietnam or urban insurgencies like Iraq, makes it exceedingly
difficult to distinguish between combatants and others, as the Geneva
Conventions require. There are still some hostilities in which large
armies are in the field against each other, openly and in uniform, and
operating under a classic command structure-the first Gulf War and the
2003 invasion of Iraq provide examples-but many other conflicts raise
difficulties in identifying the enemy and in attempting to direct fire in a
manner that does not pose unacceptable risks to non-combatants.
However, the difficulties that exist in applying the principles of the
Geneva Conventions to modem circumstances in no way justify
abandoning them. Given the immense destructive power of modem
weapons and the constant reminders of the grave toll that modem
irregular warfare takes on the innocent, there should be an energetic
effort made to adapt the Conventions, as necessary, and seek a renewed
universal commitment to their enforcement, which would be far
t
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1. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 21 (2d ed. 1992) ("War is always judged twice, first
with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the
means they adopt.").
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preferable to the efforts being made by some to marginalize or undercut
Geneva.
Some modernization of the Conventions to allow them to deal more
definitively with modem irregular warfare was attempted in Protocol I
and Protocol II, 2 with less than overwhelming success.
Further
codification of an updated law of armed conflict is provided by the
definitions of war crimes contained in the Rome Statute creating the
International Criminal Court, but that effort has been frustrated by
controversy over the Court itself, including especially the determined
opposition of the United States. However, as soon as the international
climate permits, renewed efforts should be made to build on the solid
foundation of the Geneva Conventions to deal more clearly and more
specifically with the special challenges posed by modem irregular
warfare, including at least some aspects of terrorism and the efforts made
to suppress it.
Applying the Geneva Conventions to current conflicts raises
challenges that go beyond those inherent in the difficulties posed by
combatants who may be wearing no uniform, may choose to mix with
civilians, and may utilize abhorrent tactics such as suicide bombings.
Because terrorism raises such substantial threats to our society and
because the campaign against it is just, the temptation arises to regard all
methods that may be used against terrorism as just. The United States
has succumbed to that temptation again and again after 9/11. Rather than
adhering to our nation's longstanding commitment to the Geneva
Conventions, the United States sought to render them inapplicable
through hyper-technical and often absurd interpretations. Contempt for
the strictures of Geneva was coupled with such cynical maneuvers as
creating the Guantanamo camp and "black sites," carrying out renditions,
and fending off international and domestic criticism through blatant
falsehoods ("The United States does not torture.").
It is vital that the United States recognize that its decision to cast off
the Geneva Conventions in conducting the campaign against terrorism
was a serious and short-sighted mistake. Rather than undermining or
discarding the Conventions, the United States and the other High
Contracting Parties should recommit themselves to its basic approach,
and work to make the Conventions more definitively and clearly
2. Protocol Additional (No. 1) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional (No. 2) to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
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applicable to conflicts with non-state actors.
2. Is the Justice Jackson concurrence in the Steel Seizure case really
that helpful in sorting out separation-of-powersquestions?
The concurrence by Justice Jackson in Steel Seizure states principles
that are easy to articulate but exceedingly difficult to apply. Even their
application in Steel Seizure itself is somewhat troubling, since Congress
had never prohibited the Truman Administration's effort to assume
control of productive facilities; it merely had failed to adopt proposals
that would have granted such power. Dames & Moore v. Regan affirms
the vitality of Justice Jackson's approach, while suggesting that it is more
of a continuum than a set of three firm categories. 3 Dames & Moore
also infuses
the concept of congressional approval with substantial
4
elasticity.
The Jackson approach nonetheless remains very useful. Without it,
or some similar system of categories, it is hard to see how courts would
avoid the impression that they were off on a free-ranging ramble each
time they took on a separation of powers problem that was not easily
answered primarily by reference to a single piece of Constitutional text.
Justice Jackson's formula is not needed to resolve cases like INS v.
Chadha (dealing with legislative procedures set out in Article I)5 or
Buckley v. Valeo (applying the Article II, Section 2 text relating to
appointments), 6 but it is very useful, and perhaps even necessary, in
setting up an analysis of the many separation of powers cases in which
several, or even many, different parts of the Constitution are relevant.
Justice Jackson's intuition is sound, and is often useful, primarily
because it is true to the backbone of the Constitution. Congress has
substantial, though enumerated, powers under Article I, and under
modem constitutional doctrines it has substantial leeway in deciding how
to implement those powers, so long as no specific constitutional
provision is violated. Thus, the fact that Congress has legislated in a
given area (whether to authorize or forbid executive action) makes a
huge difference for purposes of constitutional analysis, and Justice
Jackson gives appropriate weight to this factor.
The President, too, has very substantial powers under the
Constitution, but there are not many areas where it has been established

3.
4.
5.

453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981).
Id. at 680-82.
462 U.S. 919 (1983).

6.

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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that the President is constitutionally entitled to act alone, even if
Congress opposes by means of legislation. United States v. CurtissWright is powerful in endorsing the power of the President to act as the
"sole organ" of communication with other nations, 7 but the vigorous
efforts sometimes made to extend the rhetoric of that case to control the
use of force generally quickly bump up against the congressional power
to declare war and the power of the purse. Under Article II, Section 3,
the President receives Ambassadors, and no doubt the President has
broad power to carry out the foreign relations of the United States,
including communicating and negotiating with other nations, but that by
no means establishes that the President may unilaterally use military
force in a wide range of circumstances not amounting to immediate selfdefense. The current Administration often invokes the doctrine of
"inherent constitutional authority," but there is no established body of
constitutional law defining an expansive sphere within which Article II
entitles the President to act contrary to legislation. After all, CurtissWright was a situation in which Congress had authorized the presidential
action in issue, rather than forbidding it, as would be required to place a
situation within Justice Jackson's Category 3.
The influence exerted by the Jackson formula is in large measure
due to the fact that it is firmly grounded in the Article II command that
the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
Circumstances may arise in Category 3 where the President is
empowered by the Constitution itself to act contrary to legislation, but
Justice Jackson's approach hardly invites efforts by the executive to
bring itself within that narrow realm. A much more congenial approach
for the President is to allege congressional approval of the action in
question, which effectively disposes of the separation of powers dispute
and leaves it to a challenger to demonstrate that some other portion of the
Constitution is being violated. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld demonstrates this
scenario, where the Authorization for Use of Military Force was taken by
the Court to authorize the detention of citizens captured in Afghanistan,
subject to Due Process concerns.8
It has become fairly common for parties to argue that situations fall
within Category 1 or Category 3 of Justice Jackson's system. Thus, on
the sound assumption that the Administration's program of warrantless
communication intercepts amounts to "electronic surveillance" within
the meaning of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the

7. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
8. 524 U.S. 507 (2004).
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constitutional debate boils down to whether the program was authorized
by the AUMF (hence, Category 1,and permissible unless violative of the
Fourth Amendment) or prohibited by FISA (in Category
3, and illegal
9
unless FISA violates the President's Article II powers).
In many situations, Justice Jackson's approach is helpful in framing
the issues. However, if one wanders into Category 2, there appear to be
almost no guideposts, and the Supreme Court itself seems to have made
every effort to avoid describing how such a case should be approached.
The one case that does seem to involve silence on the part of Congress is
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi,10 but even that case is
not really helpful since it establishes only the power of the President to
make executive agreements that may preempt state law. The more
difficult question of how to resolve a case falling into Justice Jackson's
Category 2, where Congress has been silent and the President "can only
rely upon his own independent powers," but where Congress has or may
have authority as well, has not yet been addressed directly by the
Supreme Court. In that area, Justice Jackson's formula has not yet been
developed enough to be very useful, and perhaps that helps explain why
the courts and parties strive mightily to place situations in either
Category I or Category 3.
3. Have the executive branch's recent assertions of the state secrets
privilege broken from the doctrinal moorings of the Reynolds
decision?
Yes. Confirmation that the state secrets doctrine has been expanded
beyond all reason is provided by the decision in EI-Masri v. United
States.II Khaled El-Masri, a Lebanese-born German citizen, apparently
was detained in Macedonia due to a mistake as to his identity, and he
was later flown by the CIA to Kabul, where he was subjected to months
of mistreatment. I Even though El-Masri's case raises serious questions
about, and seeks compensation for, grievous violations of federal statutes
and international human rights standards, the district court dismissed it,
and now the Fourth Circuit has affirmed the dismissal. The court stated:
"Even if we were to conclude ... that protecting national security is less

important than litigating the merits of El-Masri's claim, we are not at
9.

See generally John Cary Sims, What NSA Is Doing... and Why It's Illegal, 33

HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105 (2006).

10.

539 U.S. 396 (2003).

11.
12.

479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
STEPHEN

PROGRAM

GREY, GHOST PLANE:

79-102 (2006).

THE TRUE

STORY OF THE

CIA

TORTURE
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liberty to abrogate the state secrets doctrine on that basis." 13
The Reynolds case itself provides a shaky foundation for the state
secrets doctrine, particularly since the accident report withheld from the
plaintiffs was later declassified, revealing that the original litigation did
not really involve military secrets, but rather concealment of government
negligence that caused the B-29 explosion at issue. 14 But at least in that
case it seemed plausible that classic military secrets might have been
involved. In recent years, the government's reliance on claims of state
secrets has become ubiquitous as a way of shutting down almost any
challenge to intelligence policies having anything to do with the "war on
terror," and has led to dismissals in extraordinary rendition cases like ElMasri's. The defense has also been raised in lawsuits challenging
warrantless electronic surveillance.
The state secrets doctrine is quickly becoming an additional and
almost-impermeable immunity doctrine, supplementing the many other
immunity principles and procedural barriers facing those who seek
recovery from the United States. The United States ratification of the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, and subsequent adoption of implementing
criminal legislation, should alone be enough to establish that illegal acts
such as those challenged by El-Masri cannot properly be regarded as
military secrets shielded by Reynolds. Perhaps the time has come for the
Supreme Court to revisit the state secrets doctrine and cut back the
enormous and poisonous beanstalk that has grown from the Reynolds
seed. If the Supreme Court will not step in, or if it accepts the virulent
expansion of Reynolds that the government has succeeded in achieving in
recent years, then Congress should enact legislation greatly narrowing
the doctrine and providing fairer procedures for its invocation. When
Reynolds was decided, the ability of courts to deal with classified
material had not been established. However, under such modern statutes
as the Freedom of Information Act and the Classified Information
Procedures Act, the courts frequently consider and make rulings on such
secrets, and similar approaches should be used in the area where
Reynolds is now looked to for guidance.
Reynolds was designed to keep the courts from intruding into
military matters in those very rare situations where it would not be
appropriate to apply the courts' methods of legal analysis. The case was
rarely invoked in the decades that followed. In recent years, however,
13.

El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 313 n.6.

14.
See Louis FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 165-211 (2006).

UNCHECKED
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and especially following 9/11, invocation of state secrets has become the
government's automatic response in a broad range of cases touching
upon national security, and the tactic is often successful.
This
development has done serious damage to the rule of law and to principles
of accountability, and should be halted or reversed.
4. Should any responsibility for gathering domestic intelligence
remain with the Federal Bureau of Investigation?
It would be a grave error to allow the Central Intelligence Agency,
the military, or a new domestic security agency to gather domestic
intelligence. Our traditions have kept that responsibility in civilian
hands, separate from espionage activities, and directly accountable to the
courts and the electorate through public trials of alleged offenders. Even
so, serious abuses have occurred from time to time, violating due process
and chilling the exercise of First Amendment rights. Since 9/11, the
investigative powers of the FBI have been supplemented, and
coordination between the FBI and other agencies, such as the CIA, has
been facilitated. There is no need to share or transfer the power to
collect domestic intelligence to any agency outside the FBI, and doing so
would create unacceptable risks to civil liberties.
5. Does Congress have the authority, if so inclined, to regulate
wiretaps for foreign intelligence purposes outside United States
territory?
There would seem to be little doubt that Congress could regulate
such electronic surveillance, at least if it is directed at United States
persons. In fact, while FISA excluded United States persons outside the
United States from its reach, Attorney General Griffin Bell told Congress
during its deliberations that dealing with that issue was the next
legislative priority.
The Administration has supported proposals that
would remove the current FISA requirement that all electronic
surveillance within the United States be authorized by the FISA Court. It
has argued that in light of the dramatic changes in the nature of the
global telecommunications network since FISA was enacted in 1978, it
no longer makes any sense to have the statute distinguish between
interceptions "within" or "outside" the United States, since
communications are often routed from origin to destination in indirect
15.

See Sims, supra note 9, at 120 n.55.
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and unpredictable ways. However, any argument that would make
geography irrelevant to the legality of domestic electronic surveillance
would suggest that the similar geographical distinction, between U.S.
persons within the United States and those outside it, is also
inappropriate.
Congress has the power to regulate interceptions outside United
States territory. As a practical matter it may be difficult or impossible to
distinguish domestic from foreign communications with any confidence,
and in any event the commerce power reaches both interstate and foreign
commerce.
6. What is the next step for the majority of the detainees in
GuantanamoBay, Cuba?
Very few, if any, of the almost 400 detainees still held at
Guantanamo (other than the "high value" detainees) retain any
intelligence value, and many likely never had any intelligence value.
Every effort should be made to release or transfer these detainees as
soon as possible. It is hard to imagine that when it launched its
unsuccessful effort to create a law-free zone at Guantanamo, the
Administration contemplated that low-level detainees would still be held
there more than five years later. Yaser Esam Hamdi was released by the
United States after the Supreme Court decided that he would be entitled
to a hearing on his status, and there is no justification for delaying any
further the release or transfer of the others like him who remain at
Guantanamo. It has proven difficult in some instances to find nations
that will accept the detainees being considered for release, but the United
States should make the commitment of whatever diplomatic or other
for them to go and thus speed up the
resources are needed to find places
16
Any accusations that will be brought
dismantling of Guantanamo.
against detainees, including the contemplated trials of a small portion of
them before military commissions, can be resolved in the United States.
As the recent controversy over access to the Guantanamo detainees by
defense counsel demonstrates, the legal status of detainees can be
litigated more conveniently within the United States, and the closure of
Guantanamo will clear the way for the United States to begin undoing
the damage that establishment of the Guantanamo facilities did to our

16. Cf Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, New to Pentagon, Gates Argued for
Closing Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, at Al (Secretary of Defense Robert M.
Gates argued unsuccessfully that Guantanamo should be closed down and the remaining
detainees transferred to the United States).
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nation's reputation and influence in the international community.
7.

Between Hamdi and Hamdan, which decision is most significant?

They are both important, and it may not be possible or necessary to
establish a hierarchy. Since Hamdi came before Hamdan, it played an
important role in reasserting the role of the courts in maintaining the rule
of law, despite energetic efforts by the Administration to resist all
judicial oversight. Hamdi also provided important guidance on the effect
to be given the Authorization for Use of Military Force, and it
established that due process applies even when the government asserts
national security interests. Hamdan was decided two years after Hamdi,
so the Supreme Court's willingness to scrutinize the legality of the
policies being followed in the government's "war on terror" had already
been established by Hamdi and Rasul. However, Hamdan refused to end
judicial involvement despite passage of the Detainee Treatment Act,
which could have been read to cut off the detainees' access to the courts.
The Court in Hamdan also took the significant step of invalidating the
procedures promulgated to govern military commission trials, but the
significance of this holding is potentially limited because it was
grounded in statutory interpretation of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. Congress then enacted an entirely new statute regulating
military commissions. All in all, these two cases are roughly comparable
in significance, with each contributing to the delivery of the broader
message from the Supreme
Court that "a state of war is not a blank check
17
for the President."
8. Between the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Director of National Intelligence, who should be responsible for
presenting covert action proposals to the National Security Council
and to the President?
Responsibility for operational planning of covert action should
reside with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA).
However, history shows that many of the most troubling issues with
regard to covert action are not about how it is to be carried out, but rather
whether the plan (even if likely to be successful in the short run) is in the
long-term interests of the United States.
Therefore, the broader
perspective to be expected from the Director of National Intelligence

17. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004), referred to the rights of citizens.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006),dealt with the rights of non-citizens.
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(DNI) suggests that it is the DNI who should present the proposals to the
National Security Council and to the President, satisfy any concerns that
may be raised, and accept responsibility for the outcome. I believe there
is some risk that a D/CIA is more likely to focus on the operational
aspects of a possible covert action, perhaps causing the D/CIA to
underrate the possibility that the action should not be attempted and is
not in the interests of the United States, even on the assumption that it
can be carried out successfully.
I believe that historically there has been an over-enthusiasm for the
prospect of covert action by the CIA, although it is not easy to generalize
about who is most likely to support a particular operation and who is
likely to raise questions or oppose it. For example, it has recently been
alleged by the former CIA Chief of Station in the Congo that President
Eisenhower authorized the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, and that
the murder was not carried out because the Chief of
Station chose not to
• 18
implement the instructions of his CIA superiors.
In any current
discussion of a possible covert action, I believe that the DNI is more
likely to see the potentially broader risks of the operation than the
D/CIA, who is more likely to ask if it could be done, and, if so, how. At
the highest levels, deliberations should concentrate on whether a
particular covert action should be attempted in the first place, not on how
it might be done.
9. Should Congress pass a law (along the lines of H.R. 4392,
Intelligence Authorization for Fiscal Year 2001) that makes the
"unauthorizeddisclosure of classified information" a crime?
No.
There is broad agreement that there is rampant
overclassification of national security information. As a result, any
statute that attempted broadly to make disclosure of classified
information a crime would work great mischief. The flood of leaks that
is taking place today would probably continue, but prosecutors would
have at their disposal a weapon that could be used to punish speech or
dissent in the most capricious ways. A very large number of government
employees would be at risk of prosecution, and there would be largely
unbridled discretion to single out those who would actually be
prosecuted. The history of prosecutions under the Espionage Act is
hardly reassuring. In prosecuting Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo
over the Pentagon Papers, Samuel Morison for innocuous disclosures to
a magazine, and now the AIPAC defendants, who did not even receive
18.

LARRY DEVLIN, CHIEF OF STATION, CONGO 94-97, 130-31, 260-61 (2007).
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any written information, the government certainly has not attempted to
punish the leaks most likely to inflict serious damage on national
security. Rather, prosecution is a selective and powerful weapon that has
a great potential to chill the open discussion of public issues, offers little
likelihood of helping to keep secret information that truly could endanger
the nation, and is almost certainl to be used unevenly and perhaps
improperly.
The culture of secrecy that leads to extravagant overclassification is
so well entrenched that it is not likely to be changed easily or quickly,
even if change were desired by those in a position to alter current
practices. As it is, the false currency of "classified documents" that
contain no secrets creates and perpetuates the endless stream of leaks in
which otherwise responsible government officials routinely disclose
information that is nominally classified but is assumed to pose no actual
risk to the country.19 In 2000, Attorney General Janet Reno opposed the
proposal to criminalize all leaks of classified information, indicating that
the preferable approach was to utilize more effective personnel security
practices.
Two2 ears later, after 9/11, the Bush Administration took
the same position.
There is very little connection between designation of a document
as "classified," even at the highest levels, and any real risk that the
information contained in it would damage the national security if
released. Certainly some classified documents do pose such a risk, but
overclassification renders the labeling of a particular document a very
poor indicator of whether damage is likely to occur upon unauthorized
disclosure. In large measure because of these realities, hundreds or even
thousands of leaks of classified information occur every month, and are
an essential, if informal, mechanism by which the public is informed

19. See, e.g., Max Frankel, The Washington Back Channel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 40 (describing in detail the techniques by which "classified"
information is used and manipulated, and observing that the trial of I. Lewis Libby
revealed "the shameless ease with which top-secret information is bartered in
Washington for political advantage").
20. See Attorney General Janet Reno, Statement Before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Regarding Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information
(June

14,

2000),

available

at

http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/

renoleaks.html ("We have never been forced to decline a prosecution solely because the
criminal statutes were not broad enough.").
21. See Letter from Attorney General John Ashcroft to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker
of

the

House

of

Representatives

(Oct.

15,

2002),

available

at

http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dojleaks.html ("I am not recommending that the
executive branch focus its attention on pursuing new legislation at this time"). See
generally STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 1077-79 (4th ed. 2007).
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about the activities of the government. A statute of the type suggested
would arm prosecutors with a very dangerous weapon that would almost
inevitably be used selectively and unfairly, and almost always to dampen
criticism of official policies. Such a statute would run directly contrary
to the interests protected by the First Amendment, and in actual practice
the enforcement of such a statute would almost certainly raise grave
constitutional questions.
10. What is the most important question in national security law
today?
Given the many recent cases accepting a wildly expansive
application of the state secrets doctrine, the most important question is
the one suggested by question number 3 above: Can use of the Reynolds
precedent somehow be limited in order to prevent the state secrets
doctrine from constituting an almost impermeable barrier to
accountability by the intelligence community for illegal or improper
actions? If not, should Reynolds be overruled? (That second question is
a rhetorical one.)

12

